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Abstract
Software piracy is the unauthorized copying or distribution of software. It is a growing problem
that results in annual losses in the billions of dollars. Prevention is a difficult problem since
digital documents are easy to copy and distribute. Watermarking is a possible defense against
software piracy. A software watermark consists of information embedded in the software, which
allows it to be identified. A watermark can act as a deterrent to unauthorized copying, since it
can be used to provide evidence for legal action against those responsible for piracy.
In this project, we present a novel software watermarking scheme that is inspired by the success
of previous research focused on detecting metamorphic viruses. We use a trained hidden Markov
model (HMM) to detect a specific copy of software. We give experimental results that show our
scheme is robust. That is, we can identify the original software even after it has been extensively
modified, as might occur as part of an attack on the watermarking scheme.
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1. Introduction
In recent years the software industry has faced a growing problem of piracy. Software piracy can
be defined as making illegal copies or using commercial software purchased by someone else.
Software piracy has many adverse effects. Each pirated copy of software takes away from
profits, reducing funds for further software development activities. In addition to reducing the
revenues for local information technology (IT) services and distribution firms, software piracy
lowers the tax revenue. Use of pirated software also increases the risk of cyber crimes and
security problems as pirated software can be used to install Trojans and malware. In spite of the
efforts of the software industry and governments across the world, software piracy has been
steadily increasing. A recent study of global personal computer software piracy by Business
Software Alliance (BSA) and IDC, IT industry’s leading global market research and forecasting
firm, shows that software piracy levels rose globally from 41% in 2008 to 43% in 2009 [1]. The
impact of software piracy on the software industry just in terms of lost revenue was more than 50
billion US dollars.
A variety of ethical, legal, and technical solutions are employed to prevent software piracy [2].
Ethical and legal techniques like copyright laws focus on making it less desirable for consumers
to use pirated software. A number of technical solutions also aid in the fight against software
piracy. Techniques like encryption and obfuscation aim to increase the difficulty and thereby, the
cost of duplicating software. Another effective technique for piracy prevention is digital
watermarking, the process of embedding information into a digital object in a way that is
difficult to remove [3]. A digital watermark enables us to determine whether the software is ours
and it could also tell us who originally purchased the software. This could reduce software piracy
since people would be less likely to illegally share software. Digital watermarks can also aid in
9

taking legal action against the pirates. Thus, digital watermarks can act as powerful deterrents to
software piracy.
In this project, we developed an approach for watermarking that was inspired by previous studies
of viruses that change their structure (but not their function) each time they replicate [4]. This
technique of transforming code into functionally equivalent but structurally different code is
called as metamorphism. It makes it difficult to detect virus since anti-virus software have fixed
signatures that do not match the metamorphic copies. Metamorphism can be used in the context
of software watermarking to embed a unique watermark in each instance of the software.
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. Background information about digital
watermarking, metamorphism, and hidden Markov models are discussed in detail in Section 2.
Section 3 contains an overview of the design of our watermarking technique. In Section 4, we
discuss our implementation in some detail and experimental results are given in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes the report.
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2. Background
In this section, we describe three concepts that are essential for understanding the work done in
this project:
i)

Digital Watermarking

ii)

Metamorphism

iii)

Hidden Markov Model

2.1 Watermarking
Watermarking is the technique of embedding some special mark in an object to identify the
object [3]. This project addresses software watermarking, which we accomplish by embedding
some special pieces of code in software to identify the software. These special pieces of code
serve as a watermark and enable us to identify the code.
2.1.1Why Watermark?
In the past, duplicating copyrighted material generally required a significant effort and there was
often a loss of quality in the duplication process. However, with digital content, a single click of
a mouse is often sufficient to make a perfect digital copy [5]. An embedded watermark can be
used to identify the purchaser of the work and thereby detect such copying. This concept is also
applicable to all types of digital content, including audio and video. Digital watermarking has
many applications which require watermarks that have different properties [6]. We discuss a few
of these applications below.
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a) Ownership Assertion
Watermarks can be used to prove ownership. Alice can embed some information in a digital
object before giving it to Bob. If Bob makes a copy of the object, then the embedded watermark
is also copied. Later if Bob distributes this copy of the object, Alice can detect the presence of
her watermark and know that it is a copy of the object owned by her. It is essential in these
applications that the watermark can be detected even if the copy is modified.
b) Tamper Detection
In some applications it is important just to know if a digital object has been tampered.
Watermarks can be used to detect tampering. For tamper detection, we can use watermarks that
become undetectable even if small modifications are made to the object. For instance, Alice can
embed such a watermark in a digital object. If Bob modifies the object, the watermark will
become undetectable revealing the fact that the object has been tampered.
c) Fingerprinting
In some applications where digital content is distributed, the owner of the content may want to
identify the person making unauthorized copies by embedding unique watermarks in each copy.
When an unauthorized copy is found, the watermark in the copy can be used to identify the
person who made the copy. In these applications the watermarking scheme must be such that it is
difficult to remove or forge a watermark.
2.1.2 Classification of Digital Watermarking Techniques
As we can see there are various properties of watermarks that are useful in different applications.
We can classify digital watermarking techniques in different ways based on these properties. One
12

way of classifying watermarks is based on the visibility [3]. Watermarks can be visible or
invisible. A visible watermark is intended to be known to the user. An example of a digital
watermark that is visible is a visible company logo in a classified document. Invisible
watermarks, on the other hand, are supposed to be imperceptible to the user. Invisible
watermarks have been proposed for digital music. Ideally, such watermarks, which are designed
to detect music piracy, must not degrade the quality of the audio and they must be sufficiently
robust to withstand attacks by the pirates.
Digital watermarks can also be classified based on their robustness [3]. A robust digital
watermark can be reliably detected even if an attacker attempts to degrade it. A fragile
watermark on the other hand is rendered undetectable even if a minor modification is applied to
the object. A robust digital watermarking scheme would provide an effective means for
copyright protection (ownership assertion/fingerprinting). In contrast, a fragile watermark could
be used to detect tampering.
Other ways of classification are also possible such as based on the embedding method (spread
spectrum, quantization type) and the capacity (zero-bit watermarking, multi-bit
watermarking) that are relevant to multimedia content [3]. In the context of software
watermarking, we can broadly classify the techniques based on the way that the embedding is
done. Static watermarking techniques embed the watermark inside the program code [7] [8].
Dynamic watermarking techniques on the other hand store the watermark in the execution state
of the program [9][10]. In this project, we focus on developing a static watermarking technique.
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2.1.3 Challenges in Digital Watermarking
Previous research in this area has shown that developing a robust watermarking scheme is a
challenging problem. In September 2000, Secure Digital Music Initiative [11], a consortium of
parties interested in preventing piracy of digital music, issued a challenge to test the strength of
four watermarking technologies [12]. For each technique, they released a file (File 1) and its
watermarked version (File 2). They also provided another watermarked music file (File 3). The
challenge was to remove the watermark from the third file without distorting the quality of
sound. No information about the watermarking technique was provided. An online “oracle” was
the only help that the testers had. Testers could send the file that they created by removing the
watermark to the oracle and it would inform them if they had succeeded, i.e., the watermark was
not detectable in their new file and it sounded like File 1. Craver et al. [14] showed that all four
techniques could be defeated using standard signal processing techniques [13]. Continuing
research in this area has shown that newer techniques for digital watermarking are still open to
such removal attacks.
Over the years, many static techniques have been developed for software watermarking. Various
kinds of attacks are possible against these techniques. Additive attacks involve inserting
additional watermark into already watermarked software. The goal of this attack is to make the
original watermark undetectable. Distortive attacks involve using semantics preserving
transformations like variable renaming and function in-lining to make the watermarks
undetectable. Subtractive attacks involve identifying the watermark and removing it without
changing the functionality of the program. In this project, we develop a watermarking scheme
based on trained hidden Markov models of executables that provides strong protection against
many of these attacks.
14

2.2 Metamorphism
Metamorphism is the process of transforming a piece of code into unique copies that are
functionally equivalent but structurally different. Metamorphism has been used widely by virus
writers to defeat signature based anti-virus software. Virus writers create metamorphic copies of
virus that can not be matched by the existing signatures. In recent years, metamorphism has also
been used by security researchers to prevent various attacks. Diversity in software can reduce the
impact of many implementation-level attacks like buffer overflow and stack smashing [15].
Metamorphism has also been used previously for generating watermarking schemes [16].
2.2.1 Assembly Language Basics
In this project, we developed a technique for watermarking based on generating metamorphic
copies of x86 assembly code. Before we discuss the operations performed by our metamorphic
generator, we provide some background information about x86 architecture and assembly
language here [17]. This will help to understand the transformations that we perform on the code.
2.2.1.1. Central Processing Unit (CPU) Internals
The term x86 refers to a family of instruction set architectures that are based on Intel 8086
processor. It is one of the most popular instruction set architectures for personal computers.
There is almost full binary backward compatibility between the Intel 8086 chip through to the
current generation of x86 processors like the Pentium series. Here we discuss the 32-bit x86
architecture. The main components of the CPU are –
1. Clock
2. Control Unit
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3. Arithmetic and Logic Unit (ALU)
4. Registers
For understanding the assembly language, we need to know the different types of registers. We
describe the types of registers below.
General Purpose Registers
The general purpose registers are used for mainly for arithmetic and data movement. These 32bit registers are:


EAX, EBX, ECX, EDX – The lower 16-bits of these registers can be accessed by
omitting the “E” from the name such “AX”. Within the AX register, each individual byte
can be accessed as “AH” (high byte) and “AL” (low byte) as shown in Figure 1.



ESP, EBP, ESI, EDI – These can be used as 32-bit registers or 16-bit registers by
removing the “E” in the name. ESP is the extended stack pointer. EBP is used as base
pointer to reference local variables in a function. ESI and EDI are used in high-speed
memory transfer instructions as source index and destination index.

Figure 1: General Purpose Registers
Segment Registers
Segment registers (CS, DS, ES, FS, GS, and SS) are used to hold the base address of preassigned areas in memory called as segments. These are 16-bit registers that are sometimes used
in conjunction with certain general-purpose registers to access specific memory locations. CS is
16

called the code segment register. It is used to point to the code within the currently executing
program. DS, called the data segment register, points to the segment containing the data of the
executing program. ES, called extra segment register, is also used in data operations, usually
with the DI register. FS and GS are used to hold extra data pointer similar to ES. SS is called
stack segment register and is used to point to the stack region.
Special Purpose Registers
There are two special purpose registers in x86 architecture. EIP, called the extended instruction
pointer, stores the address of the next instruction to be executed. EFLAG is used to keep track of
the CPU state. The value of flags in EFLAG is set by CPU whenever a mathematical or logical
operation is carried out. The value in EFLAG can be used to change the control flow of the
program. Figure 2 shows all the x86 registers.

Figure 2: x86 Registers
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2.2.1.2 x86 Instruction Set
The full x86 instruction set is large and complex [18]. The instructions consist of an “opcode”
followed by one or more operands. The operands can be a constant value, a pointer to a value in
memory, or a register. The instructions can broadly be classified as data transfer instructions,
arithmetic and logical instructions, and control flow instructions. Table 1 shows some
instructions of each type.
Data Transfer Instruction
MOV
IN, OUT
LEA
PUSH, POP

Move byte or word to register or memory
Input/output byte or word
Load Effective Address
Push/Pop word on/from stack

Arithmetic and Logical Instructions
NOT
AND
OR
XOR
ADD, SUB
INC, DEC
NEG
MUL, DIV

Logical NOT of byte or word
Logical AND of byte or word
Logical OR of byte or word
Logical XOR of byte or word
Add, subtract byte or word
Increment, decrement byte or word
Negate byte or word (two's complement)
Multiply, divide byte or word (unsigned)

Control Flow Instructions
JMP
JE/JNE
LOOP
CALL, RET

Unconditional jump
Jump if equal/Jump if not equal
Loop unconditional, count in CX, short jump
to target address
Call, return from procedure

Table 1: x86 Instruction Set
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2.2.2 Techniques for Generating Metamorphic Code
An important component of our system is the metamorphic code generator. There are a large
number of semantics preserving transformations that can be applied to assembly code to get
metamorphic copies [19]. Here we discuss some of these techniques.
2.2.2.1 Inserting Data Flow and Control Flow Preserving Instructions
In this transformation we insert single instruction or sequence of instructions that have a
combined effect of not changing the data flow and the control flow. We present a few examples
here.
1. NOP is a special instruction that has no effect on the execution state. It is simply a “do
nothing” instruction. Therefore we can insert nops between instructions as shown below.

Original Code

Transformed Code

MOV AL, BL

MOV AL, BL

ADD AL, 05H

NOP
ADD AL, 05H

2. We can use groups of arithmetic or logical instructions, the net effect of which does not
change the value of any registers. Since arithmetic instructions can change the flags, we
may need to store and restore the EFLAG register when inserting such code. Below are
some examples of such instruction groups.
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ADD AX, 05H
SUB AX, 05H
XOR AX, 0H
AND AX, FFFFH

3. We can add a label to any instruction and put a “jmp” instruction to that label just before
the instruction. This does not change the program behavior in any way.
Original Code

Transformed Code

MOV AL, BL

MOV AL, BL

ADD AL, 05H

JMP LOC1
LOC1: ADD AL, 05H

4. We can push the value of some register on the stack and pop it immediately to preserve the
program semantics.
Original Code

Transformed Code

MOV AL, BL

MOV AL, BL

ADD AL, 05H

PUSH AX
POP AX
ADD AL, 05H
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2.2.2.2 Dead Code Insertion
We can insert code that is never executed. This transformation is very useful as we can use any
combination of instructions within the dead code block. Below is an example of dead code
insertion.
Original Code

Transformed Code

MOV AL, BL

MOV AL, BL

ADD AL, 05H

JMP LOC:
PUSH AX
POP AX
ADD AL, BL
LOC: ADD AL, 05H

2.2.2.3 Equivalent Code Substitution
We can transform the code by replacing instruction(s) with equivalent instructions. Below are
some examples of equivalent code substitution
Original Code

Transformed Code

ADD AL, 05H

ADD AL, 04H
ADD AL, 01H

MOV AX, BX

PUSH AX
POP BX
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2.3

Hidden Markov Model

Markov model is a statistical model in which there are states and the probabilities of state
transitions are known [20]. In Markov models, the states are visible to the observer. A hidden
Markov model differs from a Markov model in this respect. The states in a hidden Markov
model are not visible to the observer, but the output, which is dependent on the state, is visible
[22]. Therefore, hidden Markov models have state transition probabilities as well as a probability
distribution over all possible output symbols in each state. Formally we can describe an HMM
model λ using the following parameters.
T: the length of the observation sequence
N: the number of states in the model
M: the number of observation symbols
X = {x0, x1, . . , xN−1}: the states of the Markov process
O = {O0, O1, . . , OM− 1}: set of possible observations
A: the state transition probabilities
B: the observation probability matrix
π: the initial state distribution
Figure 3 shows an example of HMM where X0, X1, .., XT-1 are the hidden states and O0, O1, ..,
OT-1 are the observed symbols in each state. A and B represent the state transition probabilities
and observation probabilities respectively.
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Figure 3: Hidden Markov Model
To understand how we can model a system as a hidden Markov model, consider the following
example [21]. A person has three coins and he is in a room tossing them in some sequence. The
room is closed and what we are shown is only the outcomes of his tossing, say,
{T,T,H,T,H,H,T,T,..}. This will be called observation sequence. We do not know the sequence in
which he is tossing the different coins, and also the bias of the various coins. We can see that the
output sequence depends on (i) the individual bias, (ii) transition probabilities between various
states, and (iii) which state is chosen to begin the observations. The above three parameters
characterize the hidden Markov model for this coin tossing experiment.
HMMs are used in many applications like speech recognition, alignment of bio sequences, and
cryptanalysis. HMMs are very useful in these applications as following three problems
associated with HMMs can be solved very efficiently:
1. For a hidden Markov model and a sequence of observations, find the likelihood that the
observed sequence can be generated by the process that is modeled.
2. For a hidden Markov model and an observation sequence, find an optimal sequence of states
in the model that can generate the observation sequence.

23

3. For an observation sequence, known number of states, and known number of observation
symbols, find the model that maximizes the probability of observing the given sequence.
In this project, we require the algorithms for problem (1) and (3) above. The solution for (3) is
used for training the model and the solution for (1) is used for detecting if a piece of code has
been watermarked by our system or not. We explain the details in the next two sections.
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3. Design Overview
The goal of this project is to design a robust watermarking scheme. The requirements for our
system can be understood by considering the following scenario. We have some software that we
want to protect from unauthorized copying. We watermark our software and sell it to some
person, say Trudy. She makes an illegal copy of this software and tries to destroy the watermark
in the copy. Our watermarking scheme should be able to detect that the copy made by Trudy was
made from our software
3.1 System Overview
Our system has two phases. In the first phase, we use a metamorphic generator to create morphed
copies of the software to be protected from piracy. We use the morphed copies for training and
generating a hidden Markov model. The learnt model acts as the watermark. The use of
morphed copies ensures that the watermark is more robust, i.e., more resistant to attacks.
Another advantage of using morphed software is that it increases the diversity and therefore
makes it difficult to attack any vulnerability in the software. Figure 4 shows the training phase of
our system.

Figure 4: Training Phase
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The second phase is the detection phase. In this phase we find out the likelihood that given
software belongs to the hidden Markov model generated in the first phase. A high score indicates
that the software is a modified copy of the morphed copies used for training. Figure 5 shows the
detection phase.

Figure 5: Detection Phase
3.1.1 Design of Metamorphic Generator
Our metamorphic generator makes morphed copies from given software. For generating these
morphed copies, various techniques like the dead code insertion and the equivalent code
substitution transformations (explained in Section 2) can be used. The operation of the
metamorphic generator is driven by three parameters that a user has to set. The first parameter is
the name of the file to be morphed. The second parameter is the amount of morphing to be done
(in percentage). This number indicates by what percentage of the number of lines of code in the
original software, the number of lines of code in the morphed copy can increase. For example, if
the number of lines in original .asm file is 1000 and we want to perform 20% of morphing, then
after morphing, the maximum number of lines of code in a morphed copy will be 1200. The third
parameter is the number of copies to be generated. Figure 6 illustrates the design of the
metamorphic generator.
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File to be morphed (IDAN.asm)

Amount of morphing to be done
(20%)

Metamorphic
Generator

100 morphed
copies (with 20%
of morphing)

Number of morphed copies
(100)
Figure 6: Metamorphic Generator
3.1.2 Robustness of HMM Based Watermarking Scheme
In our system, the hidden Markov model that is learnt in the training phase is the watermark. The
files used for training can be considered to be watermarked. This is actually a very unusual way
to watermark, since the watermark is not anything that we add to the code. To read the
watermark, an HMM will be used and it will score the software. If it scores high, then the
watermark was created with our metamorphic generator, and if not, it was not created by the
generator. From here on we will use the term “normal file” for any software that has not been
created by our metamorphic generator and hence is scored low by the HMM. Details of HMM
training and how HMM scores the software are explained in Section 4. Here we are developing a
model so that we can detect our software after it has been tampered with by an attacker (who is,
presumably, trying to remove or damage the “watermark”.).
If someone wants to remove the watermark from the software, they have to trick the HMM. So
for this, the attacker has to tamper the watermarked file such that it will start looking like a
27

normal file. One possible attack that can be carried out is to insert some amount of dead code
from normal file in the morphed (watermarked) copy. If our HMM model scores this modified
(tampered) file closer to normal file, then the attack can be considered to be successful. Previous
research has shown that it is very difficult to trick such an HMM and, therefore, this
watermarking scheme is likely to be robust. We have tested our watermarking scheme to verify
that this is the case and have presented the results in Section 5.
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4. Implementation
In this section we describe how we have implemented each component in our system.
4.1. Metamorphic Generator
We have implemented metamorphic generator as a Perl script. We have used dead code insertion
and insertion of code that does not affect the control flow and data flow of the program to
transform the input assembly code. The metamorphic generator takes as input the name of the
file to be morphed, the percentage of morphing, and the number of morphed copies to be
generated. For example, we can give the file name as “Sample.asm”, percentage of morphing as
“20%”, and number of copies as “100”. We provide some files containing different number of
instructions (J1.asm, J2.asm, …, J5.asm) to the metamorphic generator. The code in these files
can be used as dead code. Following are the steps performed in the metamorphic generator for
each of the morphed copies to be generated.
a. Compute the number of lines of code in the original file
b. Compute the number of lines of code that can be inserted, say icount, based on the
percentage of morphing and the number computed in (a).
c. Select 5 random locations where dead code is to be inserted in the morphed copy.
d. Make a copy of the original “.asm” file.
e. If icount is less than the number of lines of code in J1.asm then insert icount
instructions from J1.asm at the first random location selected in (c) and stop.
f. If icount is more than the number of lines of code in J1.asm then insert all the
instructions in J1.asm at the first random location selected in (c), decrement icount by
the number of lines in J1.asm and repeat steps (e) and (f) using the next random
location and the next junk file in the list.
29

We want to make it difficult for the attacker to identify any transformations that we have done.
So add additional code in each morphed copy that preserves the semantics but makes the file
structurally even more different. For this purpose, we insert the five code blocks shown in Table
2 at random locations in the morphed copies. To avoid detection we insert these code blocks in
very small percentage of locations. We do this by generating a random number between 1 and
800 for each line of code in the morphed copy. If the number is 1, we insert the first block shown
in the Table 2 before the current instruction being considered in the morphed copy. If it is 2, then
we select the second block, and so on.
NOP
JMP LOC_100
LOC_100:
PUSH EAX
POP EAX
ADD EAX, 0H
SUB EAX, 0H

Table 2: Instruction Blocks for Increasing Diversity
4.2 Training HMM
We collect all morphed files and use them as dataset for training HMM. For training and testing
we used cross-validation techniques [4]. Cross-validation is a technique for assessing how the
results of a statistical analysis will generalize to an independent data set. It is used where one
wants to estimate how accurately a predictive model will perform in future. One round of crossvalidation involves partitioning a sample of data into complementary subsets, performing the
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analysis on one subset (training set), and validating the analysis on the other subset (testing set) .
To reduce variability, multiple rounds of cross-validation are performed using different
partitions, and the validation results are averaged over the rounds.
We use 5-fold cross-validation. For training a model, each time, we select one of the subsets as
test data and remaining four subsets as training data for HMM. We train our model using the
assembly opcode sequences of the morphed files. For this we extract the sequences of opcodes
from each morphed copy to be used for training. We concatenated the opcode sequences to yield
one long observation sequence [4]. We used test data along with normal files for scoring
purpose. This process was repeated five times. Each time, the test data subset was changed. In
this way we got five HMM models. We see that the scores for the test data files are high while
those for the normal files are low. We use the highest score amongst normal files as a threshold.
Figure 7 shows the training phase.

Training
Dataset
(80 Files)

Hidden Markov
Model

Scoring

IDAW0.asm -1.778
IDAW1.asm -1.78
....
....
....
....

DataSet
Test Data
(20 Files)

IDAW19.asm -1.79

Comparison
Set

THRESHOLD

IDAN0.asm

-20.90

....

Other Normal
Files (30 Files)

Scores

Figure 7: HMM Training
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In the detection phase, we score the file provided to us. If the score is higher than the threshold, it
means that the file is a watermarked file. If the score is higher than the threshold, but closer to
the normal files, that means that it is a copy of a watermarked file that has been tampered.
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5. Evaluation
We evaluated the robustness of our watermarking using on many experiments. The test data that
we used for our experiments consisted of 30 executables from Cygwin version 1.5.19 [4]. These
executables were disassembled using the IDA Pro Disassembler version 4.6.0. These 30 Cygwin
utilities files were named N0.EXE to N39.EXE. We added the prefix “IDA” to the respective file
names and changed the suffix to “.ASM” from “.EXE” to denote that the files were disassembled
ASM files created by IDA Pro. For example, the file disassembled from N0.EXE was named
IDAN0.ASM. We used another executable from Cygwin version 1.5.19 as the input code to be
protected. We named the disassembled version of the file as IDAW.ASM. We named the 100
morphed copies that we generate in each for experiments as IDAW0.ASM to IDAW100.ASM
5.1 Tampering Using Dead Code Insertion
To evaluate the ability of our watermarking scheme to withstand distortion attacks, we developed
a tampering scheme to modify the morphed (watermarked) copies. The key idea here is to make
the tampered file look similar to a normal file so that the watermark is rendered undetectable. We
used our metamorphic generator for tampering the watermarked file. We copied instructions
from normal files and inserted them as dead code in the watermarked files. We called such
modified files as “tampered” files and named them as “IDAT0.ASM”, “IDAT1.ASM” and so on.
As more and more code is inserted from the normal file, the tampered file becomes similar to
normal file. The score of the tampered file moves closer to normal files within the increase in
tampering and beyond certain point the score becomes less than the threshold. We fail to detect
the watermark in such cases. We evaluated the ability of our watermarking scheme to withstand
such an attack.
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In the first experiment, we used 0% morphing. This means that all the morphed files were the
same. We generated 100 morphed files named IDAW0.ASM to IDAW99.ASM. We used 5-fold
cross validation technique, i.e., 80 files were used for training the model and 20 for generating
testing. We used the 30 normal files (IDAN0.ASM - IDAN29.ASM) for obtaining the threshold.
We generated tampered files using just dead code insertion as explained above. We varied the
percentage of additional code that is added from 2% to 90%. Figure 8 shows the scores of the
tampered files for 2%, 10%, 20%, 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, and 90% additional code.
We can clearly see in the graph that the normal files have a very low score while the
watermarked files have a very high score. Since, we are doing 0% morphing, all the morphed
files have the same score. For 2% tampered file the score is very close to the watermarked files.
As the tampering is increased, the scores become closer to the normal files. We can still detect
the files as being tampered versions of the watermarked files as the scores are more than the
normal file till 60% tampering. After 70% tampering, the files become indistinguishable from the
normal files.

34

Figure 8: Detecting Tampering (Dead Code Insertion) using 0% Morphing
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Table 3 shows the scores of some watermarked, tampered and normal files. Table 4 shows the
maximum, minimum, and the average scores for these files.

Table 3: Sample Scores of Watermarked, Tampered, and Normal Files (0 % Morphing)
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Table 4: Sample Scores of Watermarked, Tampered, and Normal Files (10% Morphing)

Maximum Score Minimum Score Average
Watermarked Files -1.77829

-1.77829

-1.77829

Tampered Files

-2.9506

-14.0354

-16.986

Normal Files

-13.806

-46.081

-59.887

Table 5: Max, Min, Average Scores
Maximum
Score
Watermarked Files -1.86300812
-3.325264237
Tampered Files
Normal Files

-13.806
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Minimum Score

Average

-2.374626063
-11.40799065

- 2.1188170915
- 7.3666274435

-46.081

-59.887

Table 6: Max, Min, Average Scores (10% Morphing)

Figure 9 shows the size of the tampered files in term of the lines of code.

Figure 9: Sizes of Tampered Files and Original File
For the second experiment, we used 10% morphing in the metamorphic generator. Figure 10
shows the results for tampering from 2%-90%. Here we can see that see the scores for the
morphed copies vary slightly. Using morphing the watermarking scheme becomes more robust
and is able to detect even 70% tampered files. But the files that are tampered more than 80% can
not be detected.
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Figure 10: Detecting Tampering (Dead Code Insertion) using 10% Morphing
Table 7 summarizes the results for 0% and 10% morphing.
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Table 7: Detection Results for 0% and 10% Morphing
5.2 Tampering Using Dead Code Insertion and Code Substitution
We performed another experiment to evaluate the robustness of our watermarking scheme
against distortion attacks. We used equivalent code substitution along with dead code insertion to
tamper the files. The equivalent code substitution is as explained in Section 2. Here the
percentage of tampering indicates both the amount of dead code inserted and the percentage of
code substituted. Figure 11 shows the results for 0% morphed files and tampered files from 2% 90%. Once gain we see that we are able to detect 2% - 60% tampered files.
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Figure 11: Detecting Tampering (Dead Code Insertion and Code Substitution) using 0%
Morphing.
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6. Conclusion and Future Work
Developing a robust watermarking scheme is a very challenging problem. No single
watermarking scheme can prevent all types of attacks [23]. In this project we developed a
watermarking scheme inspired by the success of previous research in identifying metamorphic
virus using statistical methods. Our experimental results show that our scheme is robust and can
withstand certain kinds of attacks very well.
We believe that this work is just the beginning and a lot more research needs to be done in this
area. In the future, we plan to investigate using more sophisticated techniques for metamorphic
generator and evaluate its effect on the robustness of the scheme. Also, we plan to address more
attacks in the future. And finally, we want to extend the ideas in this work by developing metametamorphic generator. A meta-metamorphic generator would be able to generate new
metamorphic generators any time that some software needs to be watermarked. Such a scheme
can potentially be more robust than our current scheme.
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